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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
CALLED INTO QUESTION AGAIN: THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HOLDS 
“OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE” RAISES 
GRAVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS IN 
VALENZUELA GALLARDO v. LYNCH 
Abstract: On March 31, 2016, in Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the phrase “an offense relat-
ing to obstruction of justice,” used as one definition of an aggravated felony 
within the Immigration and Nationality Act, raised grave unconstitutional 
vagueness concerns because there are no limits to where the process of justice 
begins and ends. This issue, identified by the Ninth Circuit, was not addressed 
by the Second or Eighth Circuits despite these courts interpreting the same 
statutory provision in separate cases. This Comment argues that the Ninth Cir-
cuit was correct on two accounts. First, the phrase, obstruction of justice, does 
raise unconstitutional vagueness concerns. Under the Board of Immigration 
Appeal’s new interpretation of the phrase, nearly every specific intent crime 
could be considered obstruction of justice. Second, the Second and Eighth 
Circuits overlooking this concern does not create a circuit split. Neither court 
held that the phrase was without unconstitutional vagueness concerns, but ra-
ther had no reason to discuss unconstitutional vagueness in their analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
For foreign nationals in the United States, the consequences of crimi-
nal activity can go far beyond fines or imprisonment.1 This is particularly 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally 8 U.S.C § 1101 (2012) (outlining immigration consequences of criminal con-
victions); id. § 1227(a)(2) (providing removal as a consequence of criminal activity for nonciti-
zens); IRA KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 86–278, (15th ed. 2016) (listing criminal 
grounds for deportation). Removal is not the only consequence of an aggravated felony convic-
tion. See RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION § 13:16 (2016 ed.) (providing analysis of 
aggravated felony consequences). A person convicted of an aggravated felony may be subject to 
expedited removal or be removed without an administrative hearing. Id. Other consequences in-
clude detainment without bond, permanent or long-term preclusion of entry into the United States, 
refusal to apply for or be granted asylum status, and preclusion from establishing good moral 
character. Id. “Alien” is another word for foreign national, both are defined as a person who is not 
a citizen of the United States. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigra-
tion Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 1965 (2013). Crimes of moral turpitude, multiple 
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true when a foreign national is convicted of an aggravated felony for which 
the consequence is removal.2 Section 1227 of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (“INA”) states that, if at any time after admission to the United 
States, a foreign national is convicted of an aggravated felony, he or she is 
removable.3 The INA defines aggravated felony by providing a list of quali-
fying criminal offenses.4 Because the consequences can be so severe, one 
would assume foreign nationals would be careful to avoid any criminal 
conduct that would result in an aggravated felony conviction.5 This be-
comes difficult, however, when foreign nationals are unable to distinguish 
which crimes are aggravated felonies and which are not.6  
The INA states that any crime with a term of imprisonment that is at 
least one year and relating to obstruction of justice is considered an aggra-
vated felony.7 The phrase obstruction of justice, however, is not defined in 
                                                                                                                           
criminal convictions, failure to register as a sex offender, controlled substance offenses, certain 
firearm offenses, sex trafficking, domestic violence, stalking, protective order violations, and child 
abuse are all crimes that may result in removal for a foreign national. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2); KUR-
ZBAN, supra, at 89–119. 
 2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (providing that conviction of an aggravated felony is grounds for 
removal); id. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (listing an offense relating to obstruction of justice as one defini-
tion of the term “aggravated felony”); id. § 1227(a)(2) (authorizing removal for aggravated felony 
convictions). Contrary to the title, aggravated felonies under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) are not always considered felonies under the state law where the foreign national was 
convicted. Jeff Joseph, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Pleas and Convictions, 35 COLO. 
LAW. 55, 59 (2006). In some cases, aggravated felonies include state law misdemeanors or munic-
ipal or petty offenses. Id. 
 3 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any 
time after admission is deportable.”). 
 4 Id. § 1101(a)(43). 
 5 See generally Rosenbloom, supra note 1, at 1966 (stating that foreign nationals who have 
any contact with law enforcement are at risk of the detention and removal process). Because the 
consequences are so grave, in 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment re-
quires defense counsel to inform noncitizens of immigration consequences of a conviction. Padilla 
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).  
 6 See Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 820 (9th Cir. 2016) (reasoning that one 
cannot determine which crimes under the INA may cause deportation); Derrick Moore, “Crimes 
Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the Void-for-Vagueness Argument Is Still Available and Meri-
torious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813, 814 (2008) (arguing that Congress has not provided a de-
tailed or workable standard for crimes that result in punishment as severe as deportation). 
 7 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means . . . an offense 
relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for 
which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.”). The INA governs the consequences of crim-
inal activity for a foreign national. See MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN BORN DEFENDANTS 38 (6th ed. 
2015) (providing an overview of consequences for criminal activity). Any crime with a term of 
imprisonment that is at least one year and relating to obstruction of justice is one of many offenses 
considered an aggravated felony under the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43) (listing all offenses 
considered aggravated felonies, including: murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor; illicit traffick-
ing of a controlled substance; illicit trafficking in firearms, destructive devices, or explosives; a 
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the INA.8 The lack of a clear definition for the phrase caused the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2016, in Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 
to hold that the phrase raises grave constitutional concerns.9  
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly raised the uncon-
stitutional vagueness question, thereby assisting foreign nationals in protect-
ing themselves from deportation.10 This Comment also argues that the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision did not create a circuit split, as no other circuit has ad-
dressed the issue.11 Part I of this Comment discusses the categorical ap-
proach, the various definitions provided for obstruction of justice in the im-
migration context, the unconstitutional vagueness doctrine, and the factual 
history of Gallardo.12 Part II explains the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) decision in In re Valenzuela Gallardo, and the appeal from the BIA’s 
decision to the Ninth Circuit in Gallardo.13 Finally, Part III argues that the 
Ninth Circuit correctly raised the unconstitutional vagueness question and by 
doing so, did not create a circuit split.14 
                                                                                                                           
crime of violence with a term of imprisonment of at least one year; a theft or burglary offense with 
a term of imprisonment of at least one year; prostitution; and more). 
 8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (stating that aggravated felony means an offense relating to 
obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term 
of imprisonment is at least one year); Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 820 (reasoning that no definition of 
obstruction of justice can be gleaned from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) case law, 
nor is there a statutory definition or settled legal meaning). The term “obstruction of justice” is not 
defined in the U.S. Code, but the Code provides a list of offenses entitled “Obstruction of Justice” 
in Chapter 73. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012). 
 9 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822 (holding that the BIA’s new interpretation of obstruction of jus-
tice provided in Valenzuela Gallardo’s case raised serious constitutional concerns, and remanding 
the case to the BIA to apply the previous interpretation of the phrase or for a new interpretation 
that does not raise constitutional concerns). 
 10 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (stating that due process is violat-
ed when a person of ordinary intelligence does not have fair notice of what conduct is prohibited); 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60. (1999) (reasoning that the Constitution does not 
permit broad provisions from the legislature which aim to catch all possible offenders, and then 
leave it to the enforcement agency to decide who should be detained); Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822 
(holding that the BIA’s definition of obstruction of justice uses amorphous phrases and thus raises 
grave constitutional concerns). 
 11 See Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822 n.8 (arguing that the other U.S. Courts of Appeals do not 
address the unconstitutional vagueness issue, thus the decision did not create a circuit split); Ar-
menta-Lagunas v. Holder, 724 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding it unnecessary to address 
the issue because the crime falls within the BIA’s narrower definition requiring a nexus to an 
ongoing judicial proceeding); Higgins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2012) (same). 
 12 See infra notes 15–50 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 51–84 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 85–109 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE: WHY CLARITY IN THE LAW IS 
EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FOR VALENZUELA GALLARDO  
AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS 
Clarity in the INA is of the utmost importance to foreign nationals, 
who need notice of what conduct can lead to deportation.15 Section A of this 
Part examines the categorical approach and how obstruction of justice has 
been defined under the INA.16 Section B provides an overview of the un-
constitutional vagueness doctrine.17 Finally, Section C discusses the factual 
background of Gallardo.18 
A. The Categorical Approach and the Attempted Definitions  
of Obstruction of Justice 
The qualifying crimes amounting to an aggravated felony are listed in 
generic terms, requiring courts and adjudicative bodies to determine wheth-
er a prior conviction under state law is a qualifying crime.19 When making 
this determination, courts use the categorical approach, looking to the ele-
ments of the penal statute as opposed to the individual foreign national’s 
conduct.20 Thus, in order for the crime at issue to be considered an aggra-
vated felony, every set of facts violating the statute at issue must satisfy the 
criteria of an aggravated felony.21 The BIA, which is the administrative ap-
pellate body that reviews immigration decisions and determines which 
crimes result in removal, may not distinguish crimes by the facts underlying 
the individual crime.22 If the past conviction includes all of the elements of 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (holding that procedural due process 
applies to deportation proceedings because entry into the United States makes a foreign national 
on U.S. soil subject to U.S. jurisdiction and a part of the population); Mary Holper, Deportation 
for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 667 (2012) (stating 
that Yamataya v. Fisher “unquestionably guarantees” foreign nationals within the United States 
the right to procedural due process in deportation proceedings). 
 16 See infra notes 19–32 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 33–39 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 39–50 and accompanying text. 
 19 See Higgins, 677 F.3d at 101 (stating that in order to determine if a crime is an obstruction 
of justice, the categorical approach is used). 
 20 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990) (stating that a factual approach as 
opposed to the categorical approach would result in practical difficulties); Higgins, 677 F.3d at 
101 (providing an explanation of the categorical approach); Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 48 
(2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the categorical approach focuses on the intrinsic nature of the crime, 
not the underlying facts). 
 21 Higgins, 677 F.3d at 101. 
 22 See Dickson, 346 F.3d at 48 (stating that in order for a crime to amount to a removable 
offense, every set of facts violating the statute at issue must satisfy the removability criteria); 
KURZBAN, supra note 1, at 18 (providing a description of the BIA and its role).  
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the generic crime, the past conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony, al-
lowing removal.23  
Among the generic crimes is any crime that has a term of imprison-
ment of at least one year and relates to the obstruction of justice, perjury, 
subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness.24 In 1999, in In re Espinoza-
Gonzalez, the BIA made one of many attempts to define obstruction of jus-
tice and held two elements required for a prior offense to qualify under the 
categorical approach: (1) the foreign national must have either actively in-
terfered with an ongoing judicial proceeding or must have acted against or 
threatened to act against someone cooperating in the process of justice; and 
(2) the foreign national must have had the specific intent of interfering with 
a judicial process.25 The BIA used Chapter 73 of the U.S. Code, entitled 
“Obstruction of Justice,” to guide its interpretation.26 Chapter 73 outlines 
federal obstruction of justice crimes, including alteration of a record, ob-
struction of proceedings, obstruction of criminal investigations, and more.27 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Higgins, 677 F.3d at 107 (holding that a witness tampering statute fulfills the generic 
offense of obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), and thus the petitioner’s convic-
tion was an aggravated felony). 
 24 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). 
 25 In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 894 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc). Any foreign 
national who has been ordered removed has a right to appeal to the BIA and he or she will not be 
removed until the appeal is complete. KRAMER, supra note 7, at 18. In light of this interpretation, 
the board concluded that misprision of a felony does not constitute an offense relating to obstruc-
tion of justice, because misprision of a felony does not require a specific intent to interfere with 
the process of justice. In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 894; cf. In re Batista-
Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955, 961 (B.I.A. 1997) (holding that accessory after the fact was an 
obstruction of justice because unlike misprision of felony, accessory after the fact requires inten-
tional action to prevent another’s trial or punishment). 
 26 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012); In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 892. The 
crime at issue in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez was misprision of a felony. In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 
I. & N. Dec. at 890–91. 
 27 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (assault on process server); id. § 1502 (resistance to extradition agent); id. 
§ 1503 (influencing or injuring officer or juror generally); id. § 1504 (influencing juror by writ-
ing); id. § 1505 (obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies and committees); id. 
§ 1506 (theft or alteration of record or process, false bail); id. § 1507 (picketing or parading); id. 
§ 1508 (recording, listening to, or observing proceedings of grand or petit juries while deliberating 
or voting); id. § 1509 (obstruction of court orders); id. § 1510 (obstruction of criminal investiga-
tions); id. § 1511 (obstruction of State or local law enforcement); id. § 1512 (tampering with a 
witness, victim or an informant); id. § 1513 (retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant); 
id. § 1514 (civil action to restrain harassment of a victim or witness); id. § 1514A (civil action to 
protect against retaliation in fraud cases); id. § 1515 (definitions for certain provisions, general 
provision); id. § 1516 (obstruction of federal audit); id. § 1517 (obstructing examination of finan-
cial institution); id. § 1518 (obstruction of criminal investigations of health care offenses); id. 
§ 1519 (destruction, alteration or falsification of records in federal investigations and bankruptcy); 
id. § 1520 (destruction of corporate audit records); id. § 1521 (retaliating against a federal judge or 
federal law enforcement officer by false claim or slander of title); In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. 
& N. Dec. at 891. 
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The BIA concluded that all of the federal crimes required either interference 
with a judicial proceeding or the intention to interfere with a person in-
volved in a judicial proceeding.28 Under the categorical approach, in order for 
a crime to be an obstruction of justice, every factual scenario of violating the 
statute at issue must include the two elements provided by the BIA.29 
In 2011, in Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit interpret-
ed the BIA’s definition of obstruction of justice to require interference with 
an ongoing judicial proceeding or investigation.30 The foreign national in 
that case had been convicted of rendering criminal assistance.31 The court 
held that because rendering criminal assistance does not require connection 
to an ongoing judicial proceeding in every circumstance, it is not an ob-
struction of justice under the categorical approach, and it does not qualify as 
an aggravated felony under the INA.32 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (outlining obstruction of justice crimes); In re Espinoza-
Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 892 (stating that even the two broadest provisions—§ 1503, prohibit-
ing persons from influencing or injuring an officer or juror generally, and § 1510, prohibiting 
obstructions of criminal investigations—still involve a federal proceeding or judicial proceeding). 
 29 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601 (stating that a categorical approach as opposed to a factual 
approach is used when determining if a crime is an aggravated felony); Higgins, 677 F.3d at 101 
(stating that under the categorical approach, every factual scenario of the crime at issue must satis-
fy the criteria of an aggravated felony); In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 892–95 
(providing the two elements of an obstruction of justice crime). 
 30 See Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2011) (interpreting the 
BIA’s definition of obstruction of justice as requiring a nexus to an ongoing judicial proceeding); 
In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 893 (holding that misprision of a felony is not an 
offense relating to obstruction of justice because misprision of a felony does not require active 
interference with a judicial proceeding or investigation).  
 31 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.080 (2016); Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1159 (rendering criminal assis-
tance in the second degree violated Washington Revised Code § 9A.76.080). The statute provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of rendering criminal assistance in the second degree if he or 
she renders criminal assistance to a person who has committed or is being sought for 
a class B or class C felony or an equivalent juvenile offense or to someone being 
sought for violation of parole, probation, or community supervision. (2)(a) Except as 
provided in (b) of this subsection, rendering criminal assistance in the second degree 
is a gross misdemeanor. (b) [not here relevant]. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.080. Utilizing the categorical approach and examining the Washing-
ton criminal code, the court determined rendering criminal assistance has three elements: (1) the 
defendant must intend to help another person evade apprehension or prosecution; (2) the defend-
ant must be aware of the fact that the person has committed a crime or is wanted by law enforce-
ment; and (3) the defendant must have done one of the acts enumerated in the statutes, which in 
this case was providing a method of transportation to the criminal. Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1162. 
 32 See Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1162, 1165 (reasoning that a connection to an ongoing judicial 
proceeding or investigation is not a necessary element of the offense, because criminal assistance, 
such as providing the escape car, can occur before any judicial proceeding or investigation has 
begun); see also Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
escape from custody was not an obstruction of justice because the crime does not require an ongo-
ing judicial proceeding but rather may occur after a judicial proceeding has concluded).  
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B. The Unconstitutional Vagueness Doctrine 
Unconstitutional vagueness is a doctrine of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth 
Amendment due process clause.33 The due process clause requires the gov-
ernment to provide due process, including notice, prior to depriving an indi-
vidual of life, liberty or property.34 Foreign nationals are entitled to these pro-
tections.35 A statute can be unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a 
person of ordinary intelligence with fair notice of the conduct prohibited or if 
it encourages or authorizes arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.36 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1112–20 (9th Cir. 
2015) (describing the doctrine and holding that the federal test for a “crime of violence” is uncon-
stitutionally vague), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 (Sept. 29, 2016). 
 34 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; infra note 36 and accompanying text (explaining the notice 
requirement). 
 35 See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101 (holding that procedural due process applies to deportation 
proceedings because entry into the United States makes a foreign national on U.S. soil subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction and a part of the population); Holper, supra note 15, at 667 (stating that Yama-
taya “unquestionably guarantees” foreign nationals within the U.S. the right to procedural due 
process in deportation proceedings). 
 36 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (stating that fair notice requires the ability of a reasonable 
person to understand what conduct is prohibited); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) 
(outlining the two independent reasons that a statute can be unconstitutionally vague); Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (stating that the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a 
statute not encourage or allow arbitrary enforcement); see also Moore, supra note 6, at 827 (stat-
ing that a statute may be unconstitutionally vague for two reasons: (1) failure to provide a person 
of ordinary intelligence an understanding of what the law prohibits; or (2) authorizing or encour-
aging arbitrary enforcement). The Supreme Court has held a loitering statute unconstitutionally 
vague. Morales, 527 U.S. at 64 (citing Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-015). The ordinance de-
fined the term “loiter” as “remaining in any one place with no apparent purpose.” Id. at 47 (inter-
nal alterations omitted). The Court held that the ordinance was a catchall provision for police 
officers because “apparent purpose” does not have a common meaning and an ordinary person 
would not know whether their conduct constituted “loitering.” Id. at 64. More recently, the Su-
preme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 is unconstitu-
tionally vague because there was uncertainty about two phrases within the clause: what crimes 
qualify as a violent felony and how much risk is considered “a serious potential risk.” See Johnson 
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (holding that the residual clause of the Armed Ca-
reer Criminal Act violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due process). The Court reasoned that 
the residual clause did not provide fair notice to defendants and it allowed for arbitrary enforce-
ment by judges. See id. Additionally, statutes must have explicit standards for those applying them 
to prevent discriminatory enforcement. Moore, supra note 6, at 827. The arbitrary enforcement 
concept was first provided by Supreme Court Justice Roberts in dissent. Screws v. United States, 
325 U.S. 91, 149 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Moore, supra note 6, at 827. Although there was 
no precedent for Justice Roberts’s argument, his reasoning can be found in many subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (using 
this reasoning to hold that an anti-picketing ordinance is unconstitutionally vague); Papachristou 
v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (applying this reasoning to hold that a vagrancy ordi-
nance was void for vagueness); Moore, supra note 6, at 827 (providing the history of discrimina-
tory enforcement as a reason for holding a statute to be unconstitutionally vague). The Roberts 
standard has become a part of the modern day test, and has since been considered even more im-
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A court, in analyzing unconstitutional vagueness, asks whether the stat-
ute has sufficient standards that allow the public to be certain about what is 
prohibited and that prevent arbitrary enforcement.37 If a statute that may oth-
erwise appear vague has developed a meaning through case law, common 
understandings, legislative history, definitions, context, administrative agency 
regulations, or law enforcement agencies, it will not be invalidated.38  
C. History of Valenzuela Gallardo’s Removal Proceedings 
Augustin Valenzuela Gallardo, the defendant in the case at issue has 
been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 2002.39 In No-
vember 2007, he was arrested and pled guilty to accessory to a felony in 
violation of California Penal Code § 32.40 Valenzuela Gallardo was initially 
                                                                                                                           
portant than the notice prong. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (stating that the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute not encourage or allow arbitrary enforcement); 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (explaining that the arbitrary enforcement aspect of 
the vagueness analysis is most important); see also Moore, supra note 6, at 827 (outlining discrim-
inatory enforcement as a reason for a statute to be unconstitutionally vague). 
 37 See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966) (holding that a Pennsylvania 
statute was unconstitutional because it had no standards and gave no conditions, limitations, or 
contingencies to those in charge of enforcement, in this case, the jury); Holper, supra note 15, at 
673 (arguing that a law does not provide fair notice if it is “standardless”). 
 38 See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 775 (1977) (holding that an Illinois obscenity statute 
was not unconstitutionally vague because the court incorporated guidelines into the statute); 
Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22 (1973) (stating that courts must evaluate how the statute has 
been interpreted by the highest court of the state when analyzing a vagueness challenge); 
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112 (reasoning that an otherwise vague section of a statute could be given 
meaning by the statute’s overall purpose); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 124 (1967) (stating that 
when examining a statute for the constitutional requirement of fair warning, the test is what Con-
gress intended, which can be gleaned from the legislative history); Hygrade Provision Co. v. 
Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) (reasoning that the word “kosher” within a statute was not 
vague because it has a well-defined meaning to those engaged in the trade of selling kosher prod-
ucts); Holper, supra note 15, at 674 (outlining ways a vague statute may develop meaning). A 
statute can also accumulate a common understanding if it has been in existence for a long time. 
Holper, supra note 15, at 674 n.182. Courts are also less likely to void statutes for vagueness when 
an administrative agency has been assigned to interpret it and make regulations. Id. at 675. This 
played a role in the Ninth Circuit decision to remand Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch to the BIA, 
instead of voiding the statute for vagueness. Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 824. 
 39 In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 839 (B.I.A. 2012). Valenzuela Gallardo is 
a citizen of Mexico. Id. A lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) is permitted to live and work in the 
United States. KRAMER, supra note 7, at 3. LPR status is typically obtained through employer 
petitions, relative petitions, or grants of asylum. Id. Even with LPR status, a foreign national is 
subject to deportation for violation of the immigration laws. Id. 
 40 CAL. PENAL CODE § 32 (West 2016); Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 811; In re Valenzuela Gallar-
do, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 839. The statute provides:  
Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a 
principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from 
arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal has 
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placed on probation, but upon violating probation was sentenced to sixteen 
months in prison.41 The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal 
proceedings in June 2010 because it asserted Valenzuela Gallardo’s convic-
tion was an aggravated felony under the INA.42 Valenzuela Gallardo filed a 
motion to terminate removal proceedings in July 2010 on the grounds that 
his offense did not relate to obstruction of justice because the statute under 
which he was convicted did not require interference with a pending judicial 
proceeding or investigation.43 The Immigration Judge denied this motion 
and ordered Valenzuela Gallardo removed to Mexico, stating that his con-
viction was an obstruction of justice for which the term of imprisonment 
was beyond one year and thus was an aggravated felony under the INA.44  
Following the Immigration Judge’s denial, Valenzuela Gallardo peti-
tioned for review by the Ninth Circuit and requested a stay of removal.45 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.46  
In light of the 2011 Hoang opinion, where the Ninth Circuit stated the 
BIA’s interpretation of obstruction of justice required a nexus to an ongoing 
judicial proceeding, the BIA sua sponte reopened Valenzuela Gallardo’s 
removal proceedings in order to clarify what the BIA thought to be a flawed 
                                                                                                                           
committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is 
an accessory to such felony.  
CAL. PENAL CODE § 32. Valenzuela Gallardo was also charged with two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance, one count of possessing methamphetamine while armed, and one count of 
failing to comply with the terms of his probation. Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 811. These charges were 
dismissed upon pleading guilty to accessory to a felony. Id. 
 41 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 811; In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 839. Thus meeting 
the INA requirement of a term of imprisonment that is at least one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). 
 42 In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 839. 
 43 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812. Under the categorical rule, it does not matter whether Valenzue-
la Gallardo’s conduct related to an obstruction of justice, it matters only that the crime for which 
the conviction was obtained relates to an obstruction of justice. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601 (stat-
ing that a categorical approach is used when determining if a crime is an aggravated felony); Hig-
gins, 677 F.3d at 101 (stating that under the categorical approach, every factual scenario of the 
crime at issue must satisfy the criteria of an aggravated felony). 
 44 In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 839; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (provid-
ing that obstruction of justice offenses constitute aggravated felonies). Removal proceedings take 
place in a formal courtroom setting, however, there are relaxed rules of evidence. KRAMER, supra 
note 7, at 22. For example, hearsay is permitted. Id. There is not an opinion for this initial removal 
proceeding. In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 838. Valenzuela Gallardo later filed a 
motion to reconsider, which was also denied. Id. 
 45 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812. 
 46 Id. The Ninth Circuit did not have jurisdiction because federal courts only have jurisdiction 
to review appeals of the BIA if there is a violation of the law, including the Constitution, on the 
part of the BIA. KRAMER, supra note 7, at 31. Federal courts can review whether the BIA applied 
the law properly and can interpret due process and equal protection constitutional claims. Id.  
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interpretation of In re Espinoza Gonzalez.47 The BIA held that In re Espino-
za Gonzalez had not limited the scope of obstruction of justice to cases 
where there is a pending judicial proceeding.48 Valenzuela Gallardo then 
filed another appeal with the Ninth Circuit challenging the BIA’s most re-
cent interpretation of obstruction of justice as unconstitutionally vague.49 
This time, his appeal was granted.50 
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S CONTENTION THAT THERE ARE GRAVE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS CONCERNS AND  
THE CONTENDED CIRCUIT SPLIT  
The INA does not define the elements of the crime of obstruction of jus-
tice.51 Since 1999, the BIA has defined the crime to include two elements: (1) 
interference or threatened interference with a judicial proceeding; and (2) 
specific intent to interfere with the process of justice.52 In 2011, in Trung 
Thanh Hoang v. Holder, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit un-
derstood that definition to include a requirement that the obstruction be relat-
ed to an ongoing judicial proceeding.53 Section A of this Part discusses the 
BIA’s 2012 response in In re Valenzuela Gallardo, holding that an ongoing 
judicial proceeding is not a necessary element of an obstruction of justice of-
                                                                                                                           
 47 See Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1162, 1164 (holding that the BIA’s definition of obstruction of 
justice requires a nexus to an ongoing proceeding); In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 
838 (stating that Valenzuela Gallardo’s case was sua sponte reopened eight months after the im-
migration judge had ordered Valenzuela Gallardo removed in light of Trung Thanh Hoang v. 
Holder).  
 48 In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 842. 
 49 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812. 
 50 Id. This time the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), a provision 
allowing judicial review of constitutional claims or questions in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D). 
 51 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means . . . an offense 
relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for 
which the term of imprisonment is at least one year . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012) (list-
ing crimes in the U.S. Code that constitute an obstruction of justice); In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 
25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 842 (B.I.A. 2012) (holding that an offense relating to an obstruction of jus-
tice does not require a nexus to an ongoing proceeding); In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
889, 894 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc) (holding that an obstruction of justice requires an intentional 
attempt to interfere with the process of justice, and a specific intent to interfere with the process of 
justice); In re Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955, 961 (B.I.A. 1997) (holding that an offense 
is an obstruction of justice when it “clearly relates” to obstruction of justice). 
 52 See In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 894 (providing the two elements of an 
obstruction of justice crime). 
 53 See Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2011) (interpreting the 
BIA’s definition of obstruction of justice as requiring a nexus to an ongoing judicial proceeding). 
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fense.54 Section B explains the 2016 decision in Valenzuela Gallardo’s ap-
peal, Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, wherein the Ninth Circuit remanded the 
case to the BIA because the offense, as then defined, raised grave constitu-
tional concerns.55 Section C discusses the contended circuit split on whether 
the phrase, obstruction of justice, is unconstitutionally vague.56 
A. The BIA Attempts Clarification 
In 2012, in In re Valenzuela Gallardo, the BIA sought to clarify its 
previous interpretation of the phrase obstruction of justice.57 A three-judge 
panel of the BIA rejected the Ninth Circuit’s application of BIA precedent, 
that obstruction of justice required a nexus to an ongoing judicial proceed-
ing, and clarified prior precedent defining obstruction of justice.58 The BIA 
held that the two elements necessary to an obstruction of justice, (1) an in-
tentional attempt to interfere with the process of justice; and (2) a specific 
intent to interfere with the process of justice, do not require an ongoing ju-
dicial proceeding or investigation.59 According to the BIA, although such 
circumstances will frequently involve an ongoing judicial proceeding, it is 
not a necessary element of obstruction of justice.60  
The BIA stated that the reference to ongoing judicial proceedings and 
investigations in the elements of an obstruction of justice offense aimed to 
illustrate that obstruction of justice is not an open-ended term that is inclu-
sive of any crime that may in some way obstruct justice.61 The BIA then 
                                                                                                                           
 54 In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 839; see infra notes 57–63 and accompany-
ing text. 
 55 Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 820 (9th Cir. 2016); see infra notes 64–75 
and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 76–84 and accompanying text. 
 57 See In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 838 (reopening Valenzuela Gallardo’s 
case sua sponte in light of the opinion in Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder). 
 58 See Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1162–64 (holding that criminal assistance does not qualify as an 
offense relating to obstruction of justice because it does not require connection to an ongoing 
judicial proceeding or investigation, but can occur before any judicial proceeding or investigation 
has begun); In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 842 (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation was reasonable, but that In re Espinoza-Gonzalez did not go so far as to hold an 
ongoing proceeding or investigation was required). Cases appealed to the BIA are typically heard 
by one judge. KRAMER, supra note 7, at 18–19. Nevertheless, if a case is of significant nature it 
will be heard en banc by a panel of three of the BIA’s fifteen sitting judges. Id. 
 59 In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 842; In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. at 894. 
 60 See In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 842–43 (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation was understandable, but that the intention was not to require connection to an ongo-
ing proceeding). 
 61 Id. at 842. To support this position, the BIA provided the example of preventing communi-
cation about a criminal offense to a law enforcement officer or judge. Id. at 842–43. Such a crime 
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held that Valenzuela Gallardo’s conviction of accessory to a felony was an 
obstruction of justice.62 Valenzuela Gallardo petitioned for review, challeng-
ing the BIA’s most recent interpretation of obstruction of justice and raising 
the question of whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague.63 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Remands and Holds the Phrase Obstruction of 
Justice Raises Grave Constitutional Concerns 
In March of 2016, in Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, over dissent, agreed with Valenzuela Gallar-
do’s argument that the BIA’s 2012 interpretation of obstruction of justice in 
In re Valenzuela Gallardo suggests that the phrase may be unconstitutional-
ly vague.64  
Writing for the majority, Judge Christen stated the BIA’s new defini-
tion of obstruction of justice blurs the boundaries of what is considered a 
part of the ‘process of justice’ and thus does not provide fair notice of what 
crimes constitute an obstruction of justice.65 The court stated that because 
the statutory phrase is amorphous, without a limitation provided by the 
BIA, essentially any crime could be considered an obstruction of justice 
under the BIA’s expanded definition.66 The court believed that the BIA’s 
statement that an obstruction of justice must not necessarily require a nexus 
to an ongoing proceeding removed the only narrowing principle that sug-
gested a beginning and end to the process of justice.67  
                                                                                                                           
does not require an ongoing judicial proceeding or investigation, but is included in the “obstruc-
tion of justice” chapter of the U.S. Code that the BIA had previously used to provide a definition 
for the term. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1510–1511; In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 842–43. 
 62 See In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 844 (reasoning that accessory to a felony 
requires a specific intent to interfere with the process of justice). 
 63 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812. 
 64 Id. at 819. The Ninth Circuit had previously deferred to the BIA’s definition of obstruction 
of justice in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez three times. See Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1165 (interpreting the 
BIA’s definition of obstruction of justice in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez to require a nexus to an on-
going proceeding, and using that interpretation to hold a conviction of criminal assistance is not an 
obstruction of justice offense); Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(deferring to the BIA because the statute was part of the INA); Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 
F.3d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 2008) (deferring to the BIA’s definition of obstruction of justice in In re 
Espinoza-Gonzalez because Congress did not provide one). 
 65 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 819. 
 66 Id. at 822; see also Gallardo v. Lynch, THE RECORDER (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.the
recorder.com/id=1202753793716/Gallardo-v-Lynch [https://perma.cc/UJ2V-MYW9] (arguing 
that under the BIA’s new interpretation, everything that occurs after a crime is committed may be 
considered a part of the justice process). 
 67 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 820. District Judge Seabright, in dissent, argues that the majority 
misunderstood In re Espinoza-Gonzalez from the beginning: the previous interpretation never 
required a nexus to an ongoing judicial proceeding or investigation. Id. at 825 (Seabright, J., dis-
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To further support its position, the Ninth Circuit looked to the sur-
rounding related offenses in the aggravated felony section of the INA, spe-
cifically perjury or subornation of perjury, and bribery of a witness, and de-
termined that all three relate to an ongoing judicial proceeding.68 Moreover, 
the court looked to the “Obstruction of Justice” chapter of the U.S. Code 
and noted that nearly all of the offenses involved an ongoing judicial pro-
ceeding or investigation, or an intent to interfere with an act related to a ju-
dicial proceeding or investigation.69 Although the government attempted to 
provide limits to the BIA’s obstruction of justice definition, the court reject-
ed their arguments.70 
Having determined that the phrase raises grave constitutional concerns, 
the court next examined whether Congress intended to have a constitution-
ally questionable interpretation of obstruction of justice.71 The court found 
no indication of this.72 Further, the court reasoned that all of Congress’s ex-
amples of an obstruction of justice involved an ongoing proceeding or in-
vestigation and thus aligned with the court’s understanding of In re Espino-
za-Gonzalez.73  
                                                                                                                           
senting). According to the dissent, the BIA’s interpretation in In re Valenzuela Gallardo was not a 
change from its own precedent, but rather a change only from Ninth Circuit precedent. Id. 
 68 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (defining aggravated felony as an offense relating to obstruc-
tion of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness with a term of imprison-
ment of at least one year); Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 821 (reasoning that the surrounding terms, per-
jury and bribery of a witness, are clearly tied to proceedings, thus Congress’s intent was for ob-
struction of justice to also be tied to proceedings). 
 69 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521; Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 821. The court used hindering communica-
tion with a law enforcement officer and harassing someone to prevent them from reporting a fed-
eral crime as examples of those offenses that do not involve a judicial proceeding but involve an 
intent to interfere with a proceeding or investigation. Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 821. 
 70 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 821–22. The Government first contended that because the BIA’s 
definition requires a specific intent to interfere with the process of justice, the definition is suffi-
ciently limited. Id. at 821. Although the court conceded that the mens rea was defined, it took 
issue with the fact that the BIA did not provide a beginning or an end to the process of justice, and 
thus left open the question of when there is specific intent to interfere with this undefined process. 
Id. at 821–22. The second limitation contended by the Government was the one-year of imprison-
ment requirement enumerated in the INA, but the court noted this limitation does not provide a 
person of ordinary intelligence with any additional guidance as to what conduct will be an ob-
struction of justice. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S); Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822; see also Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555, 2557 (2015) (holding a residual clause to be unconstitution-
ally vague despite the existence of a one-year sentence requirement). 
 71 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 823. In his dissent, District Judge Seabright raised the argument that 
the modifier “relating to” within the INA means Congress intended for the BIA to push the consti-
tutional boundary. Id. at 832 (Seabright, J., dissenting). The majority, however, rejected that any 
permission to ignore grave constitutional concerns could be given. Id. at 824 (majority opinion). 
 72 Id. at 823. 
 73 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (outlining “obstruction of justice” crimes). Under the 
Chevron framework, the court is to defer to the agency’s statutory interpretation if it is reasonable. 
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The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to either provide a 
new definition of the phrase, or to apply the definition previously provided 
in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez.74 Although the dissent suggests that the court 
should provide a limiting interpretation in the face of any unconstitutional 
vagueness, the court stated that remand aligns with Congress’s intent that 
the BIA take charge in administering the INA.75 
C. The Contended Circuit Split: The Dissent Says the Opinion  
Created a Circuit Split, the Majority Disagrees 
A major disagreement between the dissent and majority opinions in 
Gallardo was whether the majority opinion’s decision to raise an unconsti-
tutional vagueness issue regarding the obstruction of justice definition cre-
ated a circuit split.76 Following In re Valenzuela Gallardo in 2012, two oth-
er U.S. Courts of Appeals dealt with the issue of whether a crime was an 
obstruction of justice, and neither of these circuits raised an unconstitutional 
vagueness issue.77  
                                                                                                                           
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 844 (1984) (intro-
ducing and outlining the Chevron framework). Although the court applied the Chevron framework 
and understood the preference for deferring to the agency’s interpretation, the grave constitutional 
concerns prevented them from doing so. Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 817. Agency interpretations are not 
given deference if the interpretation raises constitutional doubts and a less concerning interpretation 
exists. Id.; see also DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988) (holding that an agency’s interpretation of “coercion” including the handbilling of 
consumers raised concerns of First Amendment issues and thus the agency was not entitled to 
Chevron deference). 
 74 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 824. This result is similar to a 1948 Supreme Court case, Musser v. 
Utah. See 333 U.S. 95, 98 (1948) (remanding a statute with grave constitutional concerns to the 
Supreme Court of Utah instead of voiding the statute for vagueness). There, the statute at issue 
punished any person who committed an act “injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to 
trade or commence, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due administration of 
laws.” Id. at 96 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 103-11-1(5) (1943)). The Court concluded the statute 
was far too general, resulting in the statute potentially including any act. Id. at 96–97. The Court 
remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Utah to determine if there was an interpretation from a 
state court that limited the broad reach of the statute. Id. at 97–98. 
 75 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 824; id. at 839 (Seabright, J., dissenting). 
 76 See id. at 822 n.8 (majority opinion) (holding that the decision does not create a circuit 
split); id. at 839 n.6 (Seabright, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Gallardo opinion is inconsistent 
with other circuit court opinions and thus creates a circuit split). 
 77 See id. at 839 n.6 (Seabright, J., dissenting) (listing the Courts of Appeals opinions incon-
sistent with the majority); Armenta-Lagunas v. Holder, 724 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2013) (hold-
ing that witness tampering is an obstruction of justice, and raising no unconstitutional vagueness 
concerns); Higgins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that witness tampering is 
an offense relating to obstruction of justice, but not raising the unconstitutional vagueness ques-
tion). The dissent also refers to a 2011 case of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United 
States v. Gamboa-Garcia, decided before the BIA promulgated its new definition of obstruction of 
justice in In re Valenzuela Gallardo, to support the assertion of a circuit split because the prior con-
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In Armenta-Lagunas v. Holder, a 2013 decision of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the crime at issue was witness tampering, 
and the court held that this offense was an obstruction of justice.78 Although 
the Eighth Circuit did not raise an unconstitutional vagueness concern, it 
also stated that because the state offense at issue fell within the BIA’s nar-
rower definition of obstruction of justice there was no need to address 
whether deference should be given to the BIA’s clarification.79 Similarly, in 
2012 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Higgins v. Hold-
er, held that a conviction for tampering with a witness was an obstruction of 
justice within the BIA’s more restrictive definition and did not raise the un-
constitutional vagueness question.80 A nexus to an ongoing judicial proceed-
ing or investigation was plainly required for both witness tampering statutes 
and thus, the unconstitutional vagueness issue was not discussed in the Sec-
ond or Eighth Circuits.81  
Sitting on the panel by designation, district court Judge Seabright in 
dissent, argued that the absence of an unconstitutional vagueness issue in 
these two cases created a circuit split.82 The majority’s view, however, is 
that because these cases involved offenses that were plainly obstructions of 
                                                                                                                           
viction did not “refer to a pending proceeding.” Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 839 n.6 (Seabright, J., dis-
senting) (citing United States v. Gamboa-Garcia, 620 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding an accessory 
to murder conviction was an aggravated felony)). The majority responds, however, that Gamboa-
Garcia, decided using the modified categorical approach, relied on the facts of the noncitizen’s 
crime, not the elements of the statute alone. Id. at 822 n.8 (majority opinion); Gamboa-Garcia, 620 
F.3d at 546. In any case, Gamboa-Garcia was decided using the BIA’s 1999 definition of “ob-
struction of justice,” a definition no one challenges on vagueness grounds. Gamboa-Garcia, 620 
F.3d at 546. 
 78 Armenta-Lagunas, 724 F.3d at 1020, 1022. There, the court used the definition from In re 
Espinoza-Gonzalez, requiring two elements: (1) an active interference with a judicial proceeding 
or investigation or threat of action against someone involved in a judicial proceeding or investiga-
tion; and (2) specific intent to interfere with a crime. Id. at 1022; In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & 
N. Dec. at 894. The court determined witness tampering undoubtedly requires an active interfer-
ence with an ongoing judicial proceeding or investigation. Armenta-Lagunas, 724 F.3d at 1023; 
see NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-919(1)(c), (d) (2012) (providing a person commits witness or informant 
tampering if: (1) he or she has a reasonable belief there is a pending proceeding or investigation; 
and (2) he or she attempts to cause the witness or informant to fail to show up to testify or refuse 
to testify). 
 79 Armenta-Lagunas, 724 F.3d at 1023. 
 80 Higgins, 677 F.3d at 104; see CONN. GEN. STAT § 53a-151 (2001) (stating the elements of 
witness tampering are believing a proceeding is pending or about to be instituted and inducing a 
witness to testify falsely, withhold testimony, evade legal proceedings or refuse to testify).  
 81 See Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822 n.8 (holding that the Courts of Appeals did not have a reason 
to raise an unconstitutional vagueness issue and thus did not create a circuit split); Armenta-
Lagunas, 724 F.3d at 1022 (holding that witness tampering is an obstruction of justice and raising 
no unconstitutional vagueness concerns); Higgins, 677 F.3d at 104 (same). 
 82 See Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 839 n.6 (Seabright, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
opinion is inconsistent with the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, thus creating a circuit split).  
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justice, the unconstitutional vagueness issue was not implicated.83 The ma-
jority noted that the Second and Eighth Circuits did not deny the possibility 
of an unconstitutional vagueness issue, but rather did not need to consider 
the possibility.84 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT IS CORRECT THAT “OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE” 
WITHIN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, BUT THIS OPINION  
DID NOT CREATE A CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Obstruction of justice is not defined in the INA.85 In 1999, the BIA de-
fined obstruction of justice to include two elements: 1) interference or 
threatened interference with a judicial proceeding, and 2) specific intent to 
interfere with the process of justice.86 In 2011, in Trung Thanh Hoang v. 
Holder, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit understood this def-
inition provided by the BIA to include a requirement that the obstruction be 
related to an ongoing judicial proceeding.87 The BIA responded to Hoang in 
the 2012 decision In re Valenzuela Gallardo, holding that an ongoing judi-
cial proceeding is not a necessary element of an obstruction of justice of-
fense.88 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2016 
decision Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch remanded the case to the BIA be-
cause the definition raised grave constitutional concerns.89 The court in 
Gallardo was correct on two accounts.90 First, the new interpretation of ob-
                                                                                                                           
 83 See id. at 822 n.8 (majority opinion) (arguing that the majority opinion does not create or 
perpetuate a circuit split). 
 84 See id. (arguing that omission of the issue did not create a circuit split); see also J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, If It Ain’t Broke . . . , 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 67, 70 (2009), http://www.yalelaw
journal.org/forum/if-it-aint-broke- [https://perma.cc/6SWY-33UL] (arguing that often even when 
a circuit split exists, the dispute can be better resolved through a democratic body or legislation). 
 85 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (stating that aggravated felony means an offense relating 
to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the 
term of imprisonment is at least one year); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012) (listing crimes in the 
U.S. Code that constitute an obstruction of justice); Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 
820 (9th Cir. 2016) (reasoning that no definition of obstruction of justice can be gleaned from the 
BIA’s case law, nor is there a statutory definition or settled legal meaning). 
 86 See In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 894 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc) (providing 
the two elements of an obstruction of justice crime). 
 87 See Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2011) (interpreting the 
BIA’s definition of obstruction of justice as requiring a nexus to an ongoing judicial proceeding). 
 88 In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 839 (B.I.A. 2012). 
 89 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 820. 
 90 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (stating that due process is violat-
ed when a person of ordinary intelligence does not have fair notice of what conduct is prohibited); 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60. (1999) (reasoning that the Constitution does not 
permit the legislature to cast a wide net in order to catch all possible offenders, and then leave it to 
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struction of justice provided by the BIA in 2012, in In re Valenzuela Gallar-
do, was more than a mere clarification and raised grave unconstitutional 
vagueness concerns.91 Second, the decisions of sister U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals, that the dissent argues form a circuit split with Gallardo, had no rea-
son to discuss unconstitutional vagueness and thus are not in disagreement 
with the Ninth Circuit.92 
The BIA’s interpretation of obstruction of justice in In re Valenzuela 
Gallardo deprives foreign nationals of their Fifth Amendment right to due 
process.93 Many crimes resulting in deportation are clearly defined by Con-
gress in the INA.94 It is thus evident that Congress is capable and willing to 
clearly define what criminal activity ought to result in deportation.95 Alt-
hough courts generally defer to an interpretation of a statute provided by an 
                                                                                                                           
the agency in charge of enforcement to decide who should be detained); Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822 
(holding that the BIA’s definition of obstruction of justice uses amorphous phrases and thus raises 
grave constitutional concerns); Armenta-Lagunas v. Holder, 724 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that witness tampering plainly requires a nexus to an ongoing judicial proceeding); Hig-
gins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2012) (same). 
 91 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (holding that if a person of ordinary intelligence does not have 
fair notice of what conduct is illegal, the Fifth Amendment right to due process is violated); Morales, 
527 U.S. at 64 (holding a loitering ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it gave too much 
discretion to police); Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822 (holding that the BIA’s new definition of obstruction 
of justice raises grave constitutional concerns); In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 844 
(B.I.A. 2012) (holding that an offense does not need to have a nexus to an ongoing proceeding in 
order to be an obstruction of justice offense). Obstruction of justice is not the only phrase within 
the INA that raises unconstitutional vagueness concerns. See Holper, supra note 15, at 648 (argu-
ing “crime involving moral turpitude” within the INA should be void for vagueness). 
 92 See Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822 n.8 (stating that the Ninth Circuit had not created a circuit 
split); Armenta-Lagunas, 724 F.3d at 1022 (holding that witness tampering is an obstruction of 
justice and raising no vagueness concerns); Higgins, 677 F.3d at 104 (same). 
 93 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 842 
(eliminating a nexus to an ongoing judicial proceeding); Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 280 (2003) (stating 
that the doctrine behind holding statutes as unconstitutionally vague is among the most important 
guarantees of liberty under law); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A 
Means to an End, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960) (arguing that the void for vagueness doctrine 
helps control legislative invasion of constitutional rights and insulates a “buffer zone” of added 
protection to the Bill of Rights). 
 94 See Holper, supra note 15, at 698–99 (reasoning that convictions of crimes involving con-
trolled substances and crimes involving firearms are grounds for deportability and have a precise 
definition). These crimes, involving controlled substances and firearms, reference federal statutes 
that provide definitions of “controlled substance” and “firearms.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) 
(referencing 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) for definition of controlled substance); id. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (refer-
encing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) for definitions of firearm).  
 95 See Holper, supra note 15, at 698–99 (arguing it is evident that Congress is able to clearly 
define ways a foreign national may be deported for undesirable behavior). 
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agency responsible for administering the statute, deference is inappropriate 
when an interpretation raises grave constitutional concerns.96  
In Gallardo, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the BIA’s interpretation 
of obstruction of justice provided in 2012 in In re Valenzuela Gallardo raised 
grave unconstitutional vagueness concerns.97 Without the requirement of a 
nexus to an ongoing judicial proceeding or investigation, the BIA’s definition 
of ‘process of justice’ is unbounded.98 As noted by the Ninth Circuit, under 
the BIA’s expanded definition, any specific intent crime occurring after any 
prior crime could be considered an obstruction of justice.99 With no guidance 
on what is considered the process of justice, it is impossible for a person of 
reasonable intelligence to distinguish between ordinary specific intent crimes 
and crimes that constitute an obstruction of justice.100  
Moreover, the BIA’s interpretation allows for arbitrary enforcement by 
Immigration Judges and the BIA in deciding who to deport and who to al-
low to remain in the United States.101 Because the BIA provided no limits to 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 817; see also DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (refusing to defer to an agency’s interpretation of “co-
ercion” because it raised First Amendment issues and thus raised constitutional doubts). 
 97 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (holding that if a person of ordinary intelligence does not 
have fair notice of what conduct is illegal, the Fifth Amendment right to due process is violated); 
Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822 (holding that the BIA’s new definition of obstruction of justice raises 
grave constitutional concerns); In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 844 (holding that an 
offense does not need to have a nexus to an ongoing proceeding to be an obstruction of justice 
offense). 
 98 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 820. The Ninth Circuit stated that the BIA’s definition did not have 
to be tied to a judicial proceeding, but must have some limiting principle. Id. at 822. 
 99 Id. at 822. There are many steps and processes before and after an ongoing judicial pro-
ceeding, and it is not clear from the BIA’s interpretation whether the commission of a crime alone 
could begin the process of justice, thus rendering all activity subsequent to the commission of the 
crime an obstruction of justice. See id. at 820 (arguing that there are many steps before and after 
an investigation or trial, and that the BIA’s new interpretations raise grave constitutional concerns 
about which of these steps are a part of the process of justice and which are not); Gerald Seipp, 
Ninth Circuit Finds Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo Unconstitutionally Vague, 93 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES, no. 15, art. 5, 2016 (summarizing the court’s concern about uncertainty of what crimes 
are covered under the phrase). 
 100 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (holding that it is a violation of due process if a person of 
ordinary intelligence does not have fair notice of what conduct is prohibited); Gallardo, 818 F.3d 
at 822 (arguing that although the statute includes the requirement of specific intent, that does little 
to provide fair notice of what conduct is prohibited). The lack of clarity creates an impossibility for 
lawyers as they cannot intelligently advise their clients of the potential immigration consequences for 
a conviction or plea agreement, thus making them unable to fulfill their obligation under Padilla v. 
Kentucky. See 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that under the Sixth Amendment, counsel must 
inform their clients if their convictions may result in deportation). 
 101 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (holding that the residual clause of 
the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 is unconstitutionally vague because it encourages arbi-
trary enforcement by judges); see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732–33 (2000) (holding that a 
statute regulating speech-related conduct near a health care facility did not encourage arbitrary 
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the process of justice, this interpretation of obstruction of justice allows it to 
be a catchall provision.102 The Constitution does not allow the legislature to 
write broad statutes in hopes of catching every possible offender.103 The 
lack of fair notice and encouragement of arbitrary enforcement creates an 
unconstitutional vagueness issue.104 
Although the provision does raise grave constitutional concerns, si-
lence on the issue in analogous cases of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Second and Eighth Circuits does not constitute a circuit split on the issue.105 
The offenses at issue in the Second and Eighth Circuits were not only iden-
tical to one another, but were straightforward examples of crimes relating to 
obstructions of justice.106 Thus, there was no need to address a potential 
unconstitutional vagueness issue within the BIA’s definition of obstruction 
of justice.107 The criminal statutes at issue before the Second and Eighth 
Circuits plainly required a connection to ongoing judicial proceedings or 
investigations and thus had the nexus the Ninth Circuit understood as re-
quired by In re Espinoza-Gonzalez.108 The absence of this issue is not a 
                                                                                                                           
enforcement because the statute set out guidelines for police); Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 820–21 (stat-
ing that the BIA’s new interpretation invites arbitrary enforcement); Moore, supra note 6, at 827 
(stating that explicit standards for those that apply the statutes are required). 
 102 Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 820 (stating that the BIA provided no limits to the process of jus-
tice). 
 103 See Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (arguing that it is unconstitutional for the legislature to write 
broad statutes in hopes of catching every possible offender); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 
221 (stating that allowing the legislature to write broad statutes that serve as catchall provisions 
would transform the legislative branch into the judicial branch). 
 104 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (holding that it is a violation of due process if a person of 
ordinary intelligence does not have fair notice of what conduct is prohibited); Morales, 527 U.S. at 
64 (holding that a loitering ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it encouraged arbi-
trary enforcement); Moore, supra note 6, at 827 (stating the two reasons a statute may be unconsti-
tutionally vague). 
 105 See Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822 n.8 (stating that the Ninth Circuit has not created a circuit 
split); Armenta-Lagunas, 724 F.3d at 1022 (holding that witness tampering is an obstruction of 
justice and raising no vagueness concerns); Higgins, 677 F.3d at 104 (same). 
 106 See Armenta-Lagunas, 724 F.3d at 1023 (holding that the plain language of a witness 
tampering statute undoubtedly requires interfering with the process of justice); Higgins, 677 F.3d 
at 98 (same).  
 107 See Armenta-Lagunas, 724 F.3d at 1023 (holding that witness tampering plainly requires 
interfering with the process of justice); Higgins, 677 F.3d at 98 (same); see also Ruth A. Moyer, 
Disagreement About Disagreement: The Effect of a Circuit Split or “Other Circuit” Authority on 
the Availability of Federal Habeas Relief for State Convicts, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 831, 865 (2014) 
(arguing that most circuit splits are not truly circuit splits but instead are illusory—to have a true 
or “square” circuit split would mean that the courts would actually reach different results in a case 
of identical facts); Wilkinson III, supra note 84, at 67, 69 (arguing that circuit splits are not only 
more apparent than real, but often are overstated). 
 108 See Armenta-Lagunas, 724 F.3d at 1023 (analyzing NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-919(1) and 
finding that it “undoubtedly” required connection to “proceedings of a tribunal” as required by the 
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promulgation of a circuit split but rather is the typical behavior of how a 
court treats issues irrelevant to the case at hand.109 
CONCLUSION 
The BIA’s all-encompassing definition of an offense relating to an ob-
struction of justice does not answer when the process of justice begins and 
when it ends. Rather, the BIA’s definition appears to sweep up nearly every 
specific intent crime. Thus, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
was correct to hold the phrase unconstitutional, because a foreign national 
cannot have fair notice as to what convictions will be considered an ob-
struction of justice. A more restricted definition, such as the one provided 
by the BIA in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, provides better guidance and pro-
tection for foreign nationals. When one phrase determines whether a person 
may be deported, it is crucial that the definition of that phrase is clear and 
understandable. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s decision did not create a cir-
cuit split, but rather was the first to raise a potential unconstitutional vague-
ness issue with this phrase of the INA. 
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BIA); Higgins, 677 F.3d at 104–05 (analyzing CONN. GEN. STAT § 53a-151(a) and finding that it 
“clearly includes” connection to “proceedings of a tribunal” as required by the BIA). 
 109 See Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822 n.8 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit has not created a circuit 
split); Moyer, supra note 107, at 865 (arguing that some circuit splits are illusory); Wilkinson III, 
supra note 84, at 69 (arguing that circuit splits are often more apparent than real). 
